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A general equilibrium model is built to explain if there are circumstances in which exchange
rate risk smoothing (ERRS) policies may bring a Pareto-improvement for a indebted small open
(home) economy. The model shows that this is the case when overpessimistic foreign creditors
demand a large spread on the default risk-free world interest rate, whose size can be reduced by
ERRS policies and, in addition, market imperfections, such as information asymmetry between
foreign investors and domestic debtors, prevent home economy’s residents from internalizing all
beneﬁts and costs of the exchange rate risk reallocation into their allocative decisions.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In modern times pure ﬂoating regimes are a rare phenomena. Governments tend to smooth
exchange rate ﬂuctuations to diﬀerent degrees, some act in a systematic manner, others only
in very extreme situations, but all intervene directly or indirectly at some point in time. In
some respects, this is counter-intuitive. It is well known that exchange rate is an essential price
in open economies. The movements in real exchange rates signal consumers and producers the
relative scarcity of tradable goods and guarantee that the current account reacts appropriately
to shocks in order to maintain international solvency1. So the question is why countries do not
adopt extreme pure ﬂoating? Is there any rational justiﬁcation to smooth exchange rate risk?
The public budget constraint implies that exchange rate risk smoothing (ERRS) policies
amount to a reallocation of the exchange rate risk exposure across the home economy. However,
if they are eﬃcient, in the sense that they bring a Pareto-improvement for this economy, why don’t
competitive markets signal the correct incentives for private agents to trade their risk exposures
eﬃciently? We show in the paper that, under full information and perfect competitive markets,
it is hard to understand the reason for intervention since the risk inherent to any source of
uncertainty must be eﬃciently reallocated across market participants. As a consequence, Pareto-
improving interventions are possible only if some market failure prevents private agents from
internalizing all social beneﬁts and costs of the risk reallocation into their allocative decisions.
This question is mainly relevant for many emerging markets economies with a well developed
ﬁnancial market, for which the non-existence of market mechanisms can not be used as a ground
for public intervention.
This paper takes seriously the questions raised above and builds a general equilibrium model
to explain how market imperfections, such as information asymmetry between foreign investors
and home debtors, along with other conditions, could lead ERRS policies to bring a Pareto-
improvement for a small open economy. More speciﬁcally, the model shows that this may arise
when the home economy is paying a spread over the default risk-free world interest rate - due to
the fact that foreign investors are overpessimistic about repayment - and in addition this spread
falls as a result of ERRS policies. In this case, as a result of the lower debt cost, the home
economy must export less to ﬁnance its capital account deﬁcit, increasing in this way the supply
of tradable goods for the domestic market. Therefore, not only the tradable sector wealth and
welfare increase, but also the nontradable sector takes advantage of a higher relative price for its
1Without full price ﬂexibility real exchange rate tend to move closely to nominal exchange rates.
1output.
Market imperfections, along with a spread whose size can be shrunk by ERRS policies, are
necessary, but not suﬃcient, conditions for these policies to be Pareto-improving interventions,
since they amount to a risk exposure reallocation across home economy’s sectors. ERRS policies
lead to a Pareto-improvement only if the welfare loss of the sector having its risk exposure
increased is lower that the welfare gain provided by the fall in the spread. Alternatively, these
policies will not be socially optimal if they do not cause a large enough reduction in the spread
to compensate the sector with a higher risk exposure. In particular, if foreign investors are not
so pessimistic to demand a spread, there is no scope for Pareto improvement, since the interest
rate that debtors pay is already at its lowest level.
In order ERRS policies to aﬀect the contractual interest rate on the tradable sector’s foreign
debt, it is essential that both foreign credit demand and supply curves depend on the wealth
volatility of the borrowers, which in turn depends to some extent on its exposure to exchange
rate shocks. A lower wealth volatility impacts not only on the default probability but also on the
willingness to transfer wealth to present. The net eﬀect on the debt cost depends on the relative
strength of these eﬀects.
In our model the spread is paid because foreign investors are relatively more pessimistic than
home debtors about the ability of the latter to repay. For example, consider the particular case in
which debtors have incentive to repay in all states of nature, but foreign investors do not believe
that repayment will occur in the worst states and hence they require a spread. In this case, it is
easy to see that the higher debt cost necessarily leads to a welfare loss since debtors will repay
for sure with or without spread. Therefore, any public intervention capable of reducing this
spread, such as ERRS policies, may bring a Pareto-improvement. In this sense, an important
question is whether heterogeneous beliefs about default probability is an empirically relevant
assumption, or better, in which circumstances this is more likely to be observed. As suggested
by Calvo and Mendoza (2000a,b), this assumption seems to be consistent with the fact of that
ﬁnancial globalization in a context of institutional constraints, such as short-selling restrictions,
reduces the incentives for market participants to collect costly country-speciﬁc information, so
that informational-based herd behavior is more likely to occur in international ﬁnancial market.
This in turn promotes and exacerbates contagion in ﬁnancial crisis experienced by emerging mar-
ket economies, in that foreign investors get overpessimistic about economies not fundamentally
related to the ones triggering the crisis.
Even in the favorable case for ERRS policies, an important question is still to be answered.
2Given that home country’s residents could trade privately their risk exposure, why do they
fail to internalize the welfare eﬀe c to fal o w e rd e b tc o s ti n t ot h e i ra l l o c a t i v ed e c i s i o n s ? T h e
model assumes that foreign investors are imperfectly informed about the individual portfolio
composition of each debtor. More speciﬁcally, only the aggregate exchange rate risk exposure
of each home economy’s sector can be directly observed by foreign investors, so that they are
not able to monitor the individual risk exposure of each debtor separately. As a result, if an
individual debtor decides to buy more hedge against exchange rate shocks, she is not able to take
full advantage of the impact of this decision on the spread she pays, since her sector as a whole
c a nf r e er i d eo nh e r .I nt h i ss e n s e ,t h eb e n e ﬁt in terms of a lower spread provided by a higher
hedging position turns out to be a rival and non-excludable ”good”, which allows our model to be
identiﬁed as a particular case of congestion game. In fact, as debtors do not take into account all
social beneﬁts and costs of their decisions, the amount of risk exposure reallocated across sectors
in competitive markets is below the socially optimal level. The informational friction that gives
rise the market failure above can also be supported by the fact that ﬁnancial globalization, under
institutional constraints that limit the use of costly information, tends to reduce the incentives
for foreign investor to collect costly information.
The paper does not conclude that ERRS policies will always be Pareto-eﬃcient. On the
contrary, we show that there are more cases where the opposite result occurs. The purpose is
to distinguish the circumstances under which ERRS policies could be socially justiﬁable. In this
sense, we conclude that they are more likely to occur when foreign investors are very pessimistic
about the home economy’s performance and hence about its ability to repay. The reason is
that, as foreign investors realize a high default probability, they require a large increase in the
contractual interest rate in order to provide additional credit to the home economy. Conversely,
they oﬀer a large reduction in the spread if the debt is reduced. This means that the foreign
credit’s supply curve is little responsive to the contractual interest rate, so that the eﬀect of
ERRS policies on this rate turns out to be very strong.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main hypothesis of the model.
Section 3 solves que general equilibrium solution. Section 4 derives and interprets the welfare
eﬀects of ERRS policies. Section 5 concludes.
32 Description of the Model
This section describes the central aspects of the economy that we model to explain the main
issues discussed above.
2.1 World economy Consider a nonmonetary, small open economy, which lasts for two peri-
ods: t =0 ,1. We call this economy and the rest of the world as home country and foreign country
respectively, indexed by j = H,F . The home country comprises a tradable and a nontradable
sector, indexed by i = T,NT. Each sector has a very large number of individuals, which are
identical in all aspects. Individuals can diﬀer across sectors. Whenever we refer to a sector, we
have in mind its representative agent. Foreign country’s residents are risk-neutral, whereas home
country’s ones are risk-averse. We assume rational expectations and that home country’s sectors
share the same information set. There are no artiﬁcial barriers to the international ﬂow of goods
and capital. The subscript t indicates that a variable is known at period t.
2.2 Shocks on the home country There is no production. At period t (t =0 ,1), the sector







, which can vary across periods. Given the purpose of the paper, the unanticipated
shocks introduced into the model must be able to explain, to a large extent, the empirically
observed exchange rate volatility. In this sense, as discussed in more detail below, the law of
one price implies that the shocks impacting on both nominal and real exchange rates have in
common the fact that they change the supply of the tradable good for the home country. These
shocks can have either a domestic origin, such as technological shifts in the tradable sector’s
productivity, or an external origin, such as changes in the world price of the commodities or in
the ﬂow of foreign direct investiment2. No matter the origin, the eﬀect of these shocks on the
tradable good’s domestic availability and hence on the wealth of both home country’s sectors can
b ep r o x i e di nt h em o d e lb yt h ee ﬀect of shocks to the sector T’s endowment. With this purpose,
we assume that yT





µj − η ,µ j + η
¤
,µ j > η > 0. ( 1 )
where the subscript in µj allows for heterogeneous beliefs across countries with respect to the
sector T’s expected endowment. This fact will imply that the countries may disagree on the
2As to the external shocks, this occurs because international transference of resources occurs with tradable
goods.
4sector T’s ability to repay its foreign debt. As explained above, shocks to yT
1 are the relevant
source of uncertainty in the economy. For this reason, nothing is lost if yNT
t is assumed non-
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3 (1 − 2η)
2. As shown along the paper, the possibility for µH >µ F is of
most interest, since this will allow ERRS policies to bring a Pareto-improvement under some
circumstances. But how could we provide theoretical and empirical support for this fact?
As argued by Calvo and Mendoza (2000a,b), ﬁnancial globalization could reduce the incentives
for foreign investors to collect country-speciﬁc information. This would occur if institutional
constraints such as limits on short positions kept investors from taking full advantage of costly
information, while portfolio diversiﬁcation continued to be an attractive investment strategy
even without full information3. In the context of this model, these informational frictions could
explain why µF <µ H. To see this, suppose the home country rests initially on an equilibrium
with µH = µF and next foreign investors receive a bad sign about its fundamentals. Suppose also
that this sign is false and that home country’s residents know this but cannot release credible
information for some adverse selection or moral hazard-related reason. Just as a reference, it
is worth considering ﬁrst what occurs if foreign investors act on their own account and pay the
cost to know whether the sign is true or not. In this case, their expectations on the sector T’s
productivity do not change, so that µF gets unaltered. On the other hand, suppose that the
informational frictions above lead at least a signiﬁcant fraction of the foreign investors not to have
incentive to collect information on the sign. In this case, they could assign a positive probability
to the event of that the sign is true and hence revise downwards their expectations. Once
the sign is actually false by assumption, this implies that they would become overpessimistic
about home country’s fundamentals, so that µF <µ H
4. We suggest there reasons why this
3Obviously, this results depends on that sovereign securities’ returns are less than perfectly correlated.
4Earlier work on the welfare eﬀects of overoptimism and overpessimism is Svensson and Persson (1983). They
build a two-period model very similar to ours, in which (1) agents smooth consumption over time, (2) period-2
income is uncertain and (3) the economy is keynesian at period 1, in the sense that rigidities in prices and wages
lead the output to be demand determined. Next, they show that overoptimism on the future income can have
a positive net welfare eﬀect because: (1) it has a ﬁrst order positive welfare as it expands period 1- income and
reduces the unemployment and (2) although the expectational error introduces a misallocation of consumption
over time, this eﬀect is of second order if the economy is only marginally overoptimism. The conclusion is that
overoptimism introduces a distortion that ameliorate the allocative ineﬃciency caused by price rigidities. The
same could also be said about overpessimism if there was overemployment at period 1.
As noticed along our paper, the contrasts and the similarities between the two models are evident. For instance:
without overpessimism, markets assure allocative eﬃciency here in our model. Therefore, overpessimism causes a
5could occur, both related to the destabilizing role of herd behavior in ﬁnancial markets5.T h e
ﬁrst one is that, as informational frictions do exist, international credit market is likely to be
divided into informed and uninformed investors. In addition to use their limited information
set, uninformed investors form their expectations by observing the actions of informed investors.
However, informed investors are not able to trustfully signal whether their action are induced by
changes in home country’s fundamentals or by factors relevant only for themselves. In this case, a
shock unrelated to home country’s fundamentals could lead informed investors to take an action
that would be wrongly interpreted by uninformed investors as a bad signal about home country’s
economy6. The second reason is also a history of herding, but it assumes that all investors are
evenly imperfect informed, although they have diﬀerent information sets. In this case, suppose
that just a small fraction of the market perceives a rumor as enough credible to induce a defensive
reaction against home country’s securities. If all other investors bring this action into their
information set, this could trigger a domino eﬀect on the larger group, leading it to herd on the
smaller one, so that the market a whole would end up revising downwards its expectation on the
home country’s fundamentals. Both reasons above are examples of information-based herding.
However, as explained in Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001), besides being motivated by lack of
information, herding also can occur if the compensation scheme of fund managers depends on
their performances relative to other similar professionals or to a benchmark, so that imitation is
rewarded. In this case, the institutional features of the asset management business would distort
manager’s incentives towards mimicing the market behavior7.
distortion that does not compensate another market failure, so that it leads to a welfare social loss, which in turn
is a ground for public intervention. On the other hand, positive welfare eﬀects in both models are unambiguos
only when marginal distortions (small increase in h0 and marginal overoptimism is Svensson and Persson model)
are put into action to compensate current market failures.
5Herding occurs when investors are inﬂuenced into reversing a planned decision after observing the actions of
other investors.
6For example, an event like Russian default in 1998 could lead the big players in emerging countries secu-
rities’ markets to make large margin calls, which could be interpreted by other investors as bad news about
the performance of Latin American and East Asian economies, which are not fundamentally related to Russian
economy.
7The vehicles suggested above for overpessimism are consistent to the well documented empirical evidence
of that ﬁnancial globalization has exacerbated contagion in ﬁnancial crisis experienced by emerging market
economies. Contagion occurs when an emerging economy, without having its own economic fundamentals sub-
stantially changed, is aﬀected adversely by an irrational defensive reaction of international ﬁnancial market
participants to economic turbulences in another emerging economy.
62.3 ERRS policies As explained in more detail below, shocks to yT
1 impact on relative prices
and hence they have a widespread eﬀect on the home country’s economy. In this sense, they
give rise to a macroeconomic risk to which the wealth and the welfare of both home country’s
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h0 is positive (negative), where h0 is a policy parameter
determined exogenously by the government. At this same period, the public budget constraint
implies that the government must receive this same amount from the other sector8.G i v e nt h e
simple structure of the model, ERRS policies consist in setting h0 6= 0. Obviously, no policy is
implemented when h = 0. In section 4, we examine the welfare eﬀects of a change in h0 around
h0 =0 9. This comparative statics allows us to determine whether or not ERRS policies bring a
Pareto-improvement for the home country. The size and the sign of the parameter h0 summarize
all information on the ERRS policy. Compared to h0 = 0, the sector T’s wealth volatility
decreases (increases) with a positive (negative) h0 as this sector receives a positive transference





. Moreover, just the opposite eﬀect occurs
with the sector NT’s wealth volatility, since the relative price of this sector’s endowment is
positively related to yT
1
10. Therefore, the sector T’s wealth has its exposure to exchange rate risk
decreased (increased) when h0 > 0( < 0), while the reverse occurs with the sector NT’s wealth.
As intervention in the model aims to reallocate exchange rate risk across sectors, how is this
risk related to shocks to yT
1? From the law of one price, the real exchange rate reﬂects the
relative price of the tradable good11. This fact has two consequences: (1) the primary sources of
real exchange rate volatility are shocks to the domestic supply of both tradable and nontradable
goods and (2) changes in the real exchange rate impact on the real value of assets and liabilities
held by both home country’s sectors12. In short, shocks to any sector impact on the real exchange
8The public budget must be balanced at t = 1 because the home country expires in this period.
9We just consider ERRS policies such that |h0| < κ < 1, where κ is very small. This is also discussed in the
section 4.
10This is because, when h0 > 0( < 0), the sector NT will transfer (receive) resources to (from) the government
when its wealth is reduced by an adverse shock to yT
1 , which reduces the relative price of its own endowment.
11In true, the home country’s relative price of the tradable good is the product between the real exchange rate
and the foreign country’s relative price of the tradable good. For sake of simplicity, let’s suppose that the latter
is constant.
12A real depreciation of the home currency increases the real value of the sector T’s endowment and reduces
the real valor of the sector NT’s endowment. In addition, if the foreign liabilities of home country’s sectors are
denominated in foreign currency, a higher real exchange rate has a adverse eﬀects on their wealth.
7rate and this in turn impacts on the both sectors’ wealth. Besides, shocks to diﬀerent sectors
have opposite eﬀects on the real exchange rate. Adverse shocks to nontradable good’s supply
raise domestic prices without changing nominal exchange rate, causing a real appreciation of
the home currency. On the opposite way, adverse shocks to tradables good’s supply raise the
nominal exchange rate at a rate above the inﬂation rate, causing a real depreciation of the home
currency13. It is important to note that nominal exchange rate volatility is driven just by shocks
to the tradable sector, since shocks to the nontradable sector aﬀect only the nominal aggregate
price index. Hence, since intervention, as described above, is designed just to smooth across
sectors the exposure to shocks to the domestic availability of the tradable good, which are the
disturbances hitting the nominal exchange rate, the model works as an adequate framework
t oe x a m i n eE R R Sp o l i c i e si m p l e m e n t e dt h r o u g ha ni n t e r v e n t i o ni nt h en o m i n a le x c h a n g er a t e
market.
However, if shocks to both sectors impact on the real exchange rate, why does the model
focus only on the real exchange rate volatility driven by shocks to the tradable sector? Why
not to analyze the working and the eﬀects of ERRS policies designed to smooth the exposure
to shocks to the nontradable sector, which also aﬀe c tt h er e a le x c h a n g er a t et h r o u g hc h a n g e s
in the nominal aggregate price index? Two empirical evidences lead us to limit our analysis to
shocks to the tradable sector. First, even after ﬂoating exchange rate regimes were introduced,
policymakers in some emerging economies have continued to intervene in the nominal exchange
rate markets sporadically. In fact, faced with strong pressures pushing spot exchange rate up,
monetary authorities in some of these countries provide the market with a long position on a
dollar-indexed asset (bond or derivative security)14. As the government holds the short position,
this is clearly a ERRS policy15. As seen above, since nominal exchange rate risk volatility is
13This occurs because an adverse shock to the tradable sector has two eﬀects on the home country’s prices:
(1) as long as foreign country’s nominal prices remain unaltered, the law of one price implies that the nominal
exchange rate depreciation is proportionally equal to the increase in the tradable good’s nominal price and (2)
the home country’s aggregate price index, which is a weighted average of the nominal tradable and nontradable
prices, increases proportionally less that the tradable good’s nominal price.
14Examples in Latin America are the issues of dollar-indexed Trasury bonds in Brazil, Chile and Colombia.
This way of indirect intervention in exchange rate market allows us to relate ERRS policies to the literature
on the optimal public debt indexation and denomination. Examples of this literarure are Gale (1990), Goldfajn
(1995,1998) and Missale (1997).
15Is this only fear of ﬂoating or there is a welfare argument behind these policies? As a ground for intervention,
it is argued that the high pass-through of these economies makes it essential to avoid the deleterious eﬀects of
the excessive exchange rate volatility on the internal and external equilibrium.
8driven by shocks to the tradable sector, we have thus a good reason to focus on this source of
risk. Second, many of the emerging economies referred above were successful in achieving price
stabilization in the recent past, so that real exchange rate swings are now related basically to
nominal exchange rate moves16. Thus, real exchange rate risk in these countries is expected to
be determined to large extent by the exposure to shocks to the tradable sector.
Now it is easier to understand why money is not introduced into the model. One can wrongly
interpret ERRS policies just as an instrument for reallocation of the nominal exchange rate risk
exposure and therefore feel uncomfortable with a nonmonetary approach to this issue. However,
which sort of risk is actually smoothed when ERRS policies are implemented by an intervention
in the nominal exchange rate market? In true, for the reasons cited above, intervention in this
model aims to smooth the portion of the real exchange rate risk induced by shocks to the tradable
sector, which are the disturbances that give rise to the nominal exchange rate volatility17.
ERRS policies must not be implemented just by an intervention in the nominal exchange rate
market. As an alternative policy, we could imagine that the home country’s government concede
a subsidy to the sector it wishes to protect whenever the wealth of this sector falls in consequence
of a shock to the real exchange rate. Of course that the government budget constraint would
necessarily force the other sector to bear the increase in public expenses when shocks arise, so that
this policy also causes a risk exposure reallocation across sectors. In short, all that is necessary
is some kind of public intervention through which the government is able to compensate one of
the sectors - at the expense of the other one - whenever a shock to real exchange rate reduces its
wealth. Therefore, the way as intervention is described at the beginning of this section should
be seen only as the result - in terms of transference of resources - of the institutional mechanism
set by the government.
We allow for private risk exposure reallocation by introducing a market for hedging into the
home country. More speciﬁcally, at t = 0, the sectors can trade among them a forward contract-





units of the tradable good at t =1 ,w h e r ef0 is the
market-determined premium of this contract. Note that this contract requires no disbursement
at t =0 . W ed e n o t eb yqi
0 the sector i’s hedging position acquired in this market, which can
16In this sense, Brazil and Chile are notorious examples of inﬂation targeting experiences in emerging economies.
17Another reason to build a nonmonetary model is that we are just concerned with the welfare eﬀects of
exchange rate shocks transmitted through changes in the relative prices of the tradable and the nontradable
goods. We do not address, for instance, the welfare eﬀects of these shocks induced by the higher volatility of the
inﬂation rate, whose analysis does require money.
9be a long (qi
0 > 0) one or a short (qi
0 < 0) one. This means that, given a position equal to qi
0,














0 is positive (negative). Moreover, the equilibrium level of f0 is such that the
domestic market for hedging clears, so that qT
0 + qNT
0 =0 .
2.4 Competitive international capital market At t =0 ,t h es e c t o ri (i = T,NT)c a n
concede or receive loans from the foreign country, which are promised to be repaid at t =1 .T h e
sector i’s net foreign debt at t = 0, denoted by di
0, is the net amount of loans borrowed by this
sector in this period18, which are denominated in tradable goods19.W h e ndi
0 > 0( di
0 < 0), we
say that the sector i is a debtor (creditor) of the foreign country. Therefore, the sector i transfers
wealth from t =1t ot =0w h e ndi
0 > 0 ,w h i l et h er e v e r s eo c c u r sw h e ndi
0 < 0.
The sector i may have incentive to default when it is a foreign debtor20. The penalties for
default cause a loss of utility (desutility) given by ²i ≥ 021. As default is possible, the contractual
(promised) interest rate on the foreign loans borrowed by the sector i,d e n o t e db ygi
0,m a yb e
higher than the default risk-free world interest rate, denoted by r0.B o t hgi
0 and r0 are quoted in




A se x p l a i n e di ns u b s e c t i o n2 . 2 ,ﬁnancial globalization under institutional constraints could
weaken the incentives for foreign investors to collect costly country-speciﬁci n f o r m a t i o n .I ft h i s
claim is valid for information on home country’s fundamentals, which encompasses the relevant
macroeconomic and ﬁnancial aggregate variables, so should be it for the same type of information
concerning individual economic units. The idea is that, in general, the more disaggregated the
18When di
0 < 0, the sector i is a creditor of the foreign country.
19This assumption amounts to say that foreign debt is denominated mostly in foreign currency, according to
the ”original sin” argument raised by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999). To understand this claim, note that,
as long as foreign country’s prices are constant, the law of one price implies that the eﬀect of shocks to exchange
rate on the real value of a foreign debt denominated in tradable goods is the same as that on a foreign debt
denominated in foreign currency.
20We assume that foreign country’s residents never default when di
0 < 0. However, we can say in advance
that this assumption is irrelevant because, given the purpose of the model, we will be interested only in general
equilibrium solutions such that the home country’s sectors are indebted with the foreign country.
21Penalties for default at t = 1 can not be derived endogenously in the model because the world economy ends
in this period. Therefore, we simply assume that such costs are exogenous. In the model, we assume that ²i results
from some kind of punishment that reduce the debtor’s welfare without impacting directly on its consumption.
22For instance, this fact will occur when ²T 6= ²NT.
10information is, the harder its availability is. In view of this fact, we assume that foreign investors
are imperfectly informed on the individual portfolio of each sector i’s debtor, which among other
things determines her default probability. More speciﬁcally, only the aggregate foreign debt and
the aggregate hedging position of each sector can be directly observed by foreign investors. As
said, they have imperfect information on the debtors’ individual portfolio, so that they can not
monitor directly the size of the hedging position and the size of the foreign liabilities of each
debtor23. As seen along the paper, this market imperfection-related assumption is crucial to
understand both the market structure and the allocative ineﬃciency in this model. In particular,
it allows us to explain why competitive markets could fail to reallocate eﬃciently the risk exposure
across the home country’s sectors, justifying in some circumstances public intervention through
ERRS policies.
Although the results regarding these issues be derived and interpreted in more detail below,
it is worth giving here some intuition on how market ineﬃciency arises in consequence of the
information asymmetry cited above. As described in subsection 2.5 below, each home country’s
individual maximizes her welfare by choosing the composition of her portfolio, which comprises
only her foreign debt and her hedging position. Foreign indebtedness allows her to smooth
consumption over time, while trading on the domestic hedge market allows her to change her
exchange rate risk exposure24. However, as seen in subsections 3.3 and 3.4 below, there is an
additional welfare eﬀect behind these portfolio choices: the spread paid by an individual borrower
on her foreign debt depends directly on her default probability and this in turn depends on her
portfolio. This occurs because: (1) portfolio composition aﬀects the mean and the volatility of
the debtor’s wealth distribution and then the range of states of nature in which default is the
optimal decision and (2) competition among risk-neutral foreign investors pushes the contractual
interest rate gi
0 to the level at which the expected rate of return - which falls with a higher default
probability - equals to the default-risk free interest rate.
Very important, the eﬀect of the portfolio composition on the spread can be seen as a rival
and non-excludable ”good” underlying the portfolio positions, so that this model turns out to
be a particular case of congestion game25. It is rival because the actual default probability of
23Oﬀ-balance accounts as a device to escape from the creditors’ monitoring could justify this assumption as
well, mainly in emerging economies lacki n gaw e l lr e g u l a t e db a n k i n gs y s t e m
24Individuals buying hedge have their risk exposure diminished, which brings a welfare gain as they are risk
averse. Individuals selling hedge charge a premium in exchange of a higher risk exposure.
25In congestion games, players use facilities from a common pool and the beneﬁt that a player derives from
using the facility depends on the number of users of this facility. In this class of games, decentralized decisions
11an individual debtor depends only on her own portfolio, no matter the size of the aggregate
positions held by her sector. Therefore, changes perceived by foreign investors in the portfolio of
an individual debtor will aﬀect only her spread. In other words, the spread required by creditors
from each debtor depends only on the individual portfolio they believe this debtor holds.
It is also non-excludable because the model assumes that foreign investors observe only the
aggregate foreign debt and the aggregate hedging position held by each sector and, in addition,
they know that all individuals from a same sector are identical. Therefore, if a debtor alone tries
to raise the variable X by ∆X, which can be either her foreign debt or her hedging position,
foreign investors realize that every debtor in her sector raises X by ∆X/N,w h e r eN is the
number of individuals in the sector, and then only this amount will be perceived by foreign
investors as a rise in her own position. Therefore, although she has actually risen X by ∆X,
foreign investors adjust her spread as if she had raised X only by ∆X/N. In addition, since all
other debtors in her sector can fr e er i d eo nh e r ,t h e ya l s oh a v et h e i rs p r e a dc h a n g e db yt h es a m e
size.
Consequently, in choosing her optimal portfolio, each individual debtor takes into account
only the impact of her decisions on her own spread and ignores the additional eﬀect on the spread
faced by other debtors. The idea is that once she is not able to take full advantage of the beneﬁts
and/or costs of a rise in X, she dismisses part of the social eﬀects of her portfolio choices. If
all debtors act in the same way, the market allocation is ineﬃcient. More speciﬁcally, private
markets lead to foreign overborrowing and insuﬃcient risk reallocation across sectors26.
Furthermore, the extent of this market ineﬃciency increases with N:t h el o w e rN, the closer
the social and private eﬀects of individual portfolio choices on spread are. When N is small,
∆X/N is signiﬁcant and then the spread each debtor pays will depend to some extent on her
individual portfolio choices. In this case, each individual has some market power to set her
spread. As N increases, the eﬀect of a rise in ∆X on the individual spread falls. In the context
of this model, we assume that N is large enough to make ∆X/N close to zero. Therefore, the
portfolio choices of each debtor have no eﬀect on her individual spread, so that she takes the
spread as given.
lead to a suboptimal allocation of resources.
26Burnside et al. (1999) examines the foreign debt and hedge decisions of banks in the ﬁxed exchange rate
regime. These banks borrow foreign currency-denominated external loans in order to provide domestic currency-
denominated loans to domestic ﬁrms. They argue that, without government guarantees, it is optimal for banks to
hedge completely their exchange rate risk. On the other hand, the existence of governments guarantees eliminates
the incentives for hedging and in addition banks tend to increase their exchange rate risk exposure.
122.5 Consumer behavior Each sector i (i = T,NT) consumes both goods in all periods.


































, 0 < θ < 1 , (3)
where β is the time-preference factor, θ is a constant that determines the elasticity of substi-




t are the consumption levels of the tradable and the
nontradable goods respectively, ci
t is the composite consumption index and δ
i is an indicator
function, deﬁned as δ
i =0i fdi
0 > 0a n dt h es e c t o ri defaults and as δ
i =1o t h e r w i s e 28.























































0 ≡ h0 and bNT
0 ≡− h0,w h e r e a spT
t and pNT
t are the prices of the tradable and the non-
tradable goods respectively and pt is the consumption-based aggregate price index29. Assuming
that the tradable good is the home country’s numeraire, we have pT
t =1 .T h eﬁrst term into the
brackets in (4)-(5) is the sector i’s endowment, measured in tradable goods. The second term is
the capital ﬂow with the foreign country30. The third and fourth terms in (5) are, respectively,
the transferences for the sector i in function of the ERRS policy and of its own individual hedging
position acquired in the market.
3 General Equilibrium
This section derives the general equilibrium solution for the model. As discussed in the earlier
section, the main result of the model is related to the eﬀect of ERRS policies on the contractual
























where ϕ ≡ θ
−θ(1 − θ)θ−1 > 0. Note that pt is a consumption-based index because it is the minimal expenditure
required to get ci
t =1 .
30Obviously, this term in (5) vanishes if the sector i defaults on its foreign debt (δ
i =0 ) .
13interest rate paid by the sector T on its foreign debt. Therefore, we focus only on the cases in
which this sector is a foreign debtor at t = 0. With this purpose in mind, we assume that yT
0 =0 .
Given the logarithmic period utility function in (2), this assumption implies that we will always
have dT
0 > 0 in the general equilibrium solution derived below31.
For sake of simplicity, we also assume that ²T >² NT = 0. The sector NT has less incentive to
repay its debt than the sector T does. A theoretical justiﬁcation is that penalties for default could
consist mostly in loss or reduction of foreign trade credit, which is the main source of funding to
exports. Moreover, as its desutility with default is null, the sector NT has no incentive to repay
and hence has no access to the international capital market. Therefore, as seen below, we will
have dNT
0 = 0 in equilibrium. It is important to have in mind that such assumption could be
dropped without changing the main results of the paper.
3.1 Equilibrium conditions for home country’s markets All home country’s markets





0 =0 , (6)
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It follows from (6) that, in equilibrium, the sectors must have an opposite position of same size
in the domestic market for hedging. The market equilibrium conditions for the tradable and
the nontradable goods are given by (7) and (8) respectively. As the nontradable good is not
exportable by deﬁnition, the supply of the tradable good for the home country is equal to the
endowment of this good less the home country’s net aggregate exports, whereas the supply of
the nontradable good is given only by the endowment of this good. The equilibrium conditions
for the home country’s balance of payments are given by (9)-(10): net exports must ﬁnance the
capital account deﬁcits (and also the interests at t = 1). Note that the net amount of wealth
31As yT
0 =0 ,t h es e c t o rT will have no wealth at t =0i fdT
0 = 0. This is not possible in equilibrium because
the marginal utility of consumption goes to inﬁnite when cT
0 =0 .
14transferred to the foreign country at t =1 ,g i v e nb yx1,i n c r e a s e sw i t hgi
0 and declines with default
¡
δ
i =0 ,i = T,NT
¢
. Note also that a higher di
0 (i = T, NT) causes an increase (decrease) in
the tradable good’s supply for the home country at t =0( t =1 ) .
3.2 Relative Prices By using pure algebra, it follows from (3)-(10) that relative prices in







































































Note in (11)-(14) that the relative price of any good is inversely related to the ratio between the
supply of this good and the supply of the other one for the home country33. More important is
that this result allows us to understand how shocks to yT
1 impact on the wealth of both sectors at
t = 1. For this, we assume for sake of simplicity that h0 = qT
0 = qNT
0 =0 .I nt h i sc a s e ,w ec a ns e e
in (5) that the wealth of both sectors increases with yT
1. As to the tradable sector, this occurs
because the increase in its endowment more than compensate the lower relative price of the
tradable good. As to the nontradable sector, its wealth also increase because the relative price
of its endowment increases with yT
1, although it does not receive any endowment of the tradable
good. Consequently, both sectors have their wealth exposed to shocks to yT
1. This explains why
ERRS policies (h0 6= 0) and trading on the domestic hedge market (qi
0 6=0 ,f o ri = T, NT)g i v e
rise to a risk exposure reallocation across sectors.
3.3 Default probability First, we derive the sector i’s default probability in country j’s belief,
denoted by πi
j (i = T,NT , j = H,F)34, as a function of all observable variables at t =0 ,w h i c h
a r eg i v e nb yt h ev e c t o rz0 ≡ (di
0,gi
0,q i
0,f 0)i=T,NT and the policy parameter h0
35. Although both
32As explained at the beginning of this section, we will have di
0 ≥ 0( i = T, NT) in equilibrium. Then, the
prices below are always positive.
33Note that, by assumption, pT
t =1( t =0 ,1).
34As we will see below, it is possible to have πT
H 6= πT
F because in (1) we allow for heterogeneous beliefs about
the sector T’s expected endowment.
35As the international capital market is competitive, foreign creditors take gi
0 (i = T,NT)a sg i v e n .
15di
0 and qi
0 refer to portfolio positions of the sector i’s representative agent, this does not mean
that these positions can be directly observed by foreign investors in the individual portfolio of
each sector i’s member. As it was assumed above, they can directly observe only the aggregate
net foreign debt and the aggregate hedging position of each sector. However, as foreign investors
realize correctly that identical individuals have incentive to take the same decisions, they can
infer di
0 and qi
0 indirectly from the aggregate counterparts of these variables.
The sector i repays its debt whenever the utility gain with default, denoted by χi, is smaller
or equal to the utility loss with penalties for default, given by ²i. Therefore, the sector i defaults























follows from (5), while z0 and δ
i were deﬁned above. As to the nontradable
sector, since ²NT = 0 by assumption, it follows that πNT
F = πNT
H =1i fdNT
0 > 0. As to the











































k − µj + η
2η
, if µj − η <k<µ j + η , (17)
whereas πT
j =0 ( =1 )i fk ≤ µj − η
¡
k ≥ µj + η
¢
,w h e r ek is given by the equation (16).
The ﬁgure 1 helps us understand how πT
j is determined by the equations (16) and (17) above.
The upper and lower curves are, respectively, the graphs of the period 1-utility, as a function
36Note that p1 is cancelled out out when we derive (16) from (15). This is possible because each home country’s
individual corresponds to a very small fraction of her sector, so that she realizes that her actions, such as default,
do not aﬀect the market prices. Moreover, this behavior is anticipated by foreign creditors, so that they also
believe that the sector T defaults if and only if yT
1 <k .
37The subscript j (j = H,F) indicates that the probability below is conditioned on the country j’s belief about
sector T’s expected endowment, which is given by µj.N o t e t h a t µH is known by foreign country’s investors
because, as we can see at the end of subsection 2.3, this parameter is written on the hedge contract traded in the
home market. However, as explained in subsection 2.2, this does not imply that the countries have to agree on
the sector T’s expected endowment.
16of yT
1, when the sector i defaults and when it does not38.F i x e d a n y y T
1, the utility gain with
default, given by χi in (15), is the vertical diﬀerence between these curves. As the marginal
utility of consumption is decreasing, we can see in the ﬁgure that χi increases with a lower yT
1.
Intuitively, this means that the utility gain with default increases as debtors get less wealthier.
Hence, while the utility loss with default, given by ²i,i sﬁxed, the incentives for default increase
with a lower yT
1.A sar e s u l t ,n o t ei nt h eﬁgure that, for yT
1 <k ,w eh a v eχi >² i,s ot h a ti ti s
optimal for the sector i not to repay. On the contrary, for yT
1 >k ,w eh a v eχi <² i,s ot h a ti ti s
now optimal for the sector i to repay. At yT
1 = k,w eh a v eχi = ²i a n di nt h i sc a s ew ea s s u m e
that debtors do repay. Therefore, we conclude that k,d e ﬁned in (16), is the lowest level of yT
1
at which repayment occurs, so that it can be interpreted as the eﬀective cut-oﬀ level of yT
1 for
default. Furthermore, as πT
j is, by deﬁnition, the probability that yT
1 <k , the expression in (17)
follows directly from the distribution of yT
1 in (1).
Note also that a higher gT
0 e/or dT
0 shifts the lower curve down, increasing χi for all yT
1.
Therefore, given that ²T gets unaltered, default will only occur at higher levels of yT
1,s ot h a tk
and hence πT
j increase. The intuition of this result is very clear: as the utility gain with default
increases with the size of the foreign liabilities, the default probability must also increase. This
comparative statics helps understand the other results below.
3.4 Foreign credit supply Now, we derive the equilibrium foreign credit supply for the
sector i, denoted by d
F,i
0 (i = T,NT), as a function of the contractual interest rate gT
0 and other
relevant observable variables39.T h ev a r i a b l ed
F,i
0 is, by deﬁnition, the level of di
0 that meets the
following conditions: (C1) all foreign investors currently lending this amount of credit to the
sector i are maximizing proﬁts and (C2) no additional foreign investor has incentive to provide
credit to this sector.
As to the sector NT, we saw above that ²NT = 0 implies that πNT
F = 1. Therefore, it is trivial
that d
F,NT
0 > 0 is not sustainable in equilibrium: foreign investors never lend to this sector if
they expect not to be repaid for sure.
As to the sector T, since foreign investors are risk-neutral, (C1)-(C2) imply that, given
(gT
0 ,qT
0 ,f 0,h 0)w i t hgT
0 ≥ r0,w eh a v et h a td
F,T









0 ,f 0,h 0
´
= ν , (18)













39These are the policy parameter h0 and other variables in the vector z0,a sd e ﬁned above in subsection 3.3.














0 <r 0 ,w eh a v ed
F,T
0 = 0 because (19) is not met for any positive dT
0. Note in (18)-(19)
that d
F,T
0 is such that the expected rate of return on the loans borrowed by the sector T equals
the default risk-free interest rate.
The condition (19) sets that, in equilibrium, the lowest level of yT
1 at which repayment
occurs must be necessarily equal to ν, which depends solely on gT
0 , r0 and the parameters of the
distribution of yT
1, as given in (1). Thus, we can properly interpret ν as the required cut-oﬀ of
yT
1 for default. As a result, d
F,T
0 is the level of dT
0 that makes k,t h ee ﬀective cut-oﬀ deﬁned in
(16), equal to ν, the required cut-oﬀ. Alternatively, d
F,T
0 is the level of dT
0 that makes πT
F,t h e
eﬀective default probability in country’s F belief, as deﬁn e di n( 1 7 ) ,e q u a lt o1− 1+r0
1+gT
0 ,w h i c hi s
the required default probability in country’s F belief, as we can infer from (19).
Substituting (16) into (18), we have that d
F,T






























whereas it follows from (17) and (19) that ν is given by









0 >r 0 ;( 2 1 )
ν = τ (µF − η) , for any 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 , if g
T
0 = r0 . (22)
An increase in gT
0 has two opposite eﬀects on d
F,T
0 .F i r s t ,ah i g h e rgT
0 leads foreign investors
to make more proﬁts on the loans they will be actually repaid, so that they have incentive to lend
more. Second, as it was mentioned above, sector T’s foreign liabilities increase with gT
0 , pushing
πT
F up and hence leading foreign investors to curb the supply of loans. As a result, for low levels
of gT
0 ,t h eﬁrst eﬀect is dominant, so that the supply curve is increasing in gT
0 . However, the
second eﬀect gets stronger as d
F,T
0 increases with gT
0 , making the supply curve more inelastic. At
a certain level of gT
0 ,t h es e c o n de ﬀect overcomes the ﬁrst one, so that the supply curve becomes
decreasing in gT
0 .
Given the purpose of the model, it is important to explain how a change in h0 impacts on πT
F
and hence on d
F,T
0 .T h i se ﬀect is better illustrated in ﬁgure 2, where the upper and lower thin
40Note below that gT
0 , qT
0 and f0 are the only variables in the vector z0,a sd e ﬁned above, on which d
F,T
0 depend.
18curves are, respectively, the graphs of the period 1-utility function with and without default for
the case h0 = 0, whereas the upper and lower thick curves are, respectively, the graphs of the
period 1-utility function with and without default for the case h0 > 0. Note in this ﬁgure that,
when compared to h0 =0 ,ap o s i t i v eh0 makes the sector T’s wealth increase when yT
1 <µ H
and decrease when yT
1 >µ H, leading to a rotation in the period 1-utility curve around yT
1 = µH,
which gets ﬂatter with h0 > 0t h a nw i t hh0 = 0. This occurs either with default, represented by
the rotation from the upper thin curve to the upper thick one, or without default, represented
by the rotation from the lower thin curve to the lower thick one. Moreover, as the marginal
utility of consumption is decreasing, this eﬀect is stronger without default. This is clear in the
ﬁg u r e ,w h e r e ,e x c e p tf o ry T
1 = µH, the vertical distance between the two lower curves is larger
than that between the upper ones. The intuition behind this result is that default makes debtors
wealthier and hence they value less changes in their wealth caused by ERRS policies. Therefore,







that the eﬀect of a higher h0 on πT
F and hence on d
F,T
0 is ambiguous and depends on whether
ν - the required cut-oﬀ for default in equilibrium, is higher or lower than µH.W e h a v e b o t h
cases illustrated in ﬁgure 2. When ν = νlow <µ H (ν = νhigh >µ H), the utility gain at yT
1 = ν
decreases (increases) with a higher h0, pushing k -t h ee ﬀective cut-oﬀ for default - and πT
F down
(up). Therefore, since gT
0 is taken as ﬁxed by foreign investors and πT
F increases with dT
0, as seen
in the previous subsection, d
F,T
0 must be higher (lower) in order to bring k and πT
F back to their
required equilibrium levels, given by ν and 1 − 1+r0
1+gT
0 respectively.






,t h ev e c t o r( di
0,q i
0,f 0)i=T,NT on which the










, meets the following con-
ditions: (C3) both sectors maximize the lifetime utility function in (2)-(3) subject to the in-
tertemporal budget constraint in (4)-(5), (C4) all home country’s markets clear in both periods,
namely, the equilibrium conditions in (6)-(10) are satisﬁed and (C5) period 0-expectations about
the relative prices pNT
1 and p1 are formed rationally41.
In order to meet (C3), the equilibrium solution must satisfy the marginal conditions of opti-
















19mization with respect to di
0 and qi


























=0 ,i = T,NT. (24)
Note that such conditions were derived with gi
0 having been taken as given by sector i’s indi-
v i d u a l s .A se x p l a i n e di ns u b s e c t i o n2 . 4 ,t h i sp r i c e - t a k i n gb e h a v i o ri nt u r nf o l l o w sd i r e c t l yf r o m
the assumption that foreign investors can observe, for each sector, only the aggregate net for-
eign debt and the aggregate hedging position. Individual portfolio choices can not be observed
directly. Therefore, as there is a large number of participants in each sector deciding on their
actions in a decentralized way, they correctly realize that the impact of their individual choices
on the aggregate portfolio of her sector and hence on the contractual interest rate is irrelevant.
In order to meet (C4)-(C5), we must substitute (4)-(5) and (11)-(14) into (23)-(24). As a















44 with ²T -t h e
desutility with default - so large that, for any gT
0 , the sector T does never have incentive to default
in equilibrium, even when yT
1 reaches its lower bound. As we can note from (15)-(17), this means











that, in its own belief, the utility gain with default is always smaller than the desutility with
penalties for default, namely, πT
H = 0 in equilibrium. This assumption can be dropped without
changing the main results of the model, which are presented in the next section45. The existence
of a vector ΦH which assures an equilibrium solution with πT
H = 0 is proved in the appendix,
where we still show that in this case d
H,T


































0 (h0)a n dfH
0 = fH
0 (h0)a r ed e ﬁned as the solution of the
equation system (A2) through (A4) in the appendix. We can see in this system that λ, q
H,T
0 and
42The subscript H indicates that the expectation below is conditioned on the home country’s belief about sector
T’s endowment, which is given by µH.






if and only if this vector is a
solution for this system. The suﬃciency follows from the strict concavity of the lifetime utility in (2).
44These are the only relevant parameters for the sector T’s problem of portfolio choice. Note that µF / ∈ ΦH as
it refers to country F’s beliefs.
45As it will be clear in the next section, we just need the possibility for heterogeneous beliefs, as given in (1),
so that µF can be lower than µH.
20fH
0 a r ew r i t t e nj u s ti nf u n c t i o no fh0 because they do not depend on gT
0 and gNT
0 .T h i s i n
turn implies that d
H,T
0 does not depend on gNT






0 are derived independently of the equilibrium solution for qNT
0 and dNT
0 .










(6) and into the equation (23) for i = NT respectively.
It is trivial in (25) that d
H,T
0 decreases with a higher gT
0 , the contractual interest rate. More
interesting is that d
H,T
0 also depends on the ERRS policy parameter h0 a n do nt h eh e d g i n g
position q
H,T
0 . This occurs because these variables impact on the period 1-wealth volatility and
hence on the incentives that individuals have to smooth consumption over time: they are less
encouraged to transfer wealth to present when they feel less conﬁdent about period 1- wealth.
Therefore, we can conclude that a change in h0 shifts both the foreign credit’s supply and demand
curves (as functions of gT
0 ), given in (20) and (25) respectively. This in turn implies that the
eﬀect of a higher or lower h0 on the equilibrium level of gT
0 is ambiguous, as it depends on the
parameters of the model, which determine ultimately the relative strength of a change in h0 on
those curves.
3.6 General equilibrium solution The general equilibrium solution for the vector of en-
dogenous variables z0 ≡ (di
0,gi
0,q i






i=T,NT,i nf u n c t i o n
of the policy parameter h0 and the vector of structural parameters Φ ≡
¡




¯ f0 = ¯ f0 (h0,Φ)=f
H







0 (h0),i = T,NT , (27)
¯ d
T
















0 , ¯ q
T




















0 (h0,Φ)f o ri = T,NT. Next, we sketch the derivation of ¯ z0. First, it follows from





µF − [λ(µH − η) − η]
− 1 , if λ(µH − η) − η <µ F < λ(µH − η)+η,( 3 0 )
¯ g
T
0 = r0 , if λ(µH − η)+η ≤ µF ;( 3 1 )
46There is no equilibrium if µF ≤ λ(µH − η) − η. In this case, the credit demand curve relies on the right of
the supply curve and there is no intercept between them.
21where λ = λ(h0)w a sd e ﬁned in subsection 3.5. Note that ¯ gT
0 >r 0 in (30)47. Second, substituting
¯ f0,¯ qT
0 and ¯ gT
0 ,a sd e ﬁn e da b o v e ,i n t o( 2 8 ) ,w eg e t¯ dT
0. Third, substituting ¯ gT
0 into (29), we get
¯ gNT
0
48. Fourth, it follows from (6) that ¯ qT
0 =¯ qNT
0 . Finally, the other endogenous variables -
exports, prices and consumption - can be derived directly from ¯ z0 through the equations (3)-(5),
(7)-(14) and the solution of the optimization problem in footnote 29. Note that all conditions
(C1)-(C5) in subsections 3.4 and 3.5 are met when z0 =¯ z0:b o t ht h eh o m ea n df o r e i g nc o u n -














As shown along the proof of the proposition in the appendix, since πT
H = 0 in equilibrium, it
follows from (16)-(17) that λ ≤ 1. Moreover, as λ does not depend on µF, it follows from (30)-
(31) that the term λ(µH − η)+η is the cut-oﬀ level of µF for a spread to be paid in equilibrium.
Note also that λ ≤ 1 implies that a spread is paid if and only if µF < λ(µH − η)+η ≤ µH
49-i.e.,
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a positive spread is that foreign investors are suﬃciently
more pessimistic than home debtors about the sector T’s performance and ability to repay. To
better understand the case in (30), note that, although the sector T has never incentive to default












50, foreign investors do not share this view when
µF is suﬃciently lower than µH, since in this case they realize that the sector T is not able to
repay all this debt in the lowest levels of yT
1. T h i si nt u r ni m p l i e st h a tπT
F > 0 and hence the
arbitrage condition in (19) is not observed for gT
0 = r0. Therefore, foreign investors will provide
less credit than the amount demanded by the sector T, pushing gT
0 up. Faced with a higher gT
0 ,
the sector T will demand less credit and foreign investors will be willing to supply more credit.
The market equilibrium will only occur at gT
0 =¯ gT
0 , when condition (28) is met.





48To understand the equilibrium condition in (29), remember that, as seen in subsections 3.3 and 3.4, the
assumption of that ²NT = 0 implies that d
F,NT






should set ¯ gNT
0 such that d
H,NT
0 = 0 in (29). In this case, we can also set d
F,NT
0 = 0, since it is optimal for foreign
investors to lend nothing when they expected not to be repaid for sure.
49To verify this result, note that µH > η in (1).
50According to (25), this is the amount of foreign credit that the sector T wishes to borrow when gT
0 = r0.
224W e l f a r e e ﬀect of ERRS policies
This section derives and interprets the welfare eﬀects of ERRS policies. As explained in subsec-
tion 2.3, such policies in this model amount to set h0 6= 0. More precisely, we show that ERRS
policies may be or not Pareto-improving interventions and that this depends, among other fac-
tors, on how much pessimist foreign investors are with respect to the sector T’s ability to repay,
i.e., the extent µF is below µH. We assume that the world economy rests initially on a general
equilibrium solution as the one deﬁned in the previous section. Analytical tractability restricts
us to examine interventions that consist in small changes of h0 around 0.
First, we deﬁne V i as the sector i ’s lifetime utility as a function of h0 and Φ,s ot h a t
V
i = V
i (h0;Φ) ≡ U
i [¯ z0,h 0] ,i = T,NT (32)
where ¯ z0 =¯ z0 (h0), as deﬁned in subsection 3.6 above, is the general equilibrium solution for the
vector of endogenous variables z0 ≡ (di
0,gi
0,qi
0,f 0)i=T,NT,,w h i l e
U
















t (i = T,NT , t=0 ,1), written as a function of z0 and h0, is determined by (4)-(5) and
(11)-(14). More intuitively, the function V i gives the sector i ’s lifetime utility when the world
economy rests on a general equilibrium solution for a given h0 and Φ.
Next, we examine the optimality of a departure of h0 from 0. Such an intervention leads
to a Pareto-improvement if and only if ∆V i ≡ V i (h0;Φ) − V i (0;Φ) ≥ 0f o ri = T,NT,w i t h
strict inequality for at least one sector. We just analyze small enough changes in h0 to be well





h0 ,i = T,NT ;( 3 4 )
∂V T (0;Φ)
∂h0

























1 − (1 + ¯ gT
0 ) ¯ dT
0
¸




























1 − (1 + ¯ gT







< 0 , (39)
where all the derivatives in (37)-(39) are evaluated at ¯ z0 =¯ z0 (0) and h0 =0 .
The ﬁrst derivative in (37) is the direct eﬀect of a higher h0 on the sector T’s welfare, holding
¯ gT
0 constant: its sign is positive as this sector has its wealth volatility decreased51.N o t e t h e
opposite sign of this eﬀect on the sector NT’s welfare. This shows that a change in h0 leads to
a risk exposure reallocation across home country’s sectors. As one can see in subsection 2.3, the
r e a s o nf o rt h i si st h a tt h ew e a l t ho fboth sectors increases with a higher yT
1 a n dd e c r e a s e sw i t ha
lower yT
1, so that hedging a sector against shocks to yT
1 rises necessarily the risk exposure of the
other one.
The negative sign of the derivatives in (39) indicates that the welfare of both sectors increases
with a fall in ¯ gT
0 . The intuition behind this result is that the reduction of the sector T’s foreign
liabilities, caused by a lower level of ¯ gT
0 , not only increases the wealth of this sector, but also allows
the home country as a whole to export less in order to ﬁnance its foreign liabilities, increasing
thereby the domestic supply of the tradable good. Therefore, the sector NT also takes advantage
of a lower ¯ gT
0 through the increase in the relative price of its endowment.
We still have to examine the expression for
∂¯ gT
0
∂h0 in (38), whose size will determine whether or
not a change in h0 is a Pareto-improving intervention. For this, we examine in subsections 4.2
and 4.3 below both cases in which the sector T pays and does not pay a spread on its foreign
debt in equilibrium. Before this, however, it is very helpful to examine in subsection 4.1 what
would happen if we dropped the assumption of information asymmetry about debtors’ individual
portfolios. This result works as a benchmark which help us explain why ERRS may be eﬃcient
when this assumption is introduced52.
51This can be proved by using the Jensen’s inequality.
52In focusing only on Pareto-improving interventions along this section, we ignore the whole issue of ”distribu-
tional weights”. In practice, however, the implementation of ERRS policies should depend, among other things,
on the policymaker’s preferences. This issue can be formally addressed by assuming that the home country’s
government maximizes a social welfare function given by W
¡
V T,VNT¢
, which is increasing with respect to the
individual welfare of each sector. It follows from (32) that we can write it as a function of the policy parameter h0,
so that W (h0;Φ)=W
£
V T (h0;Φ),VNT (h0;Φ)
¤
. In this case, marginal ERRS policies, which consist in a very
small increase in h0, will be implemented if and only if the derivative of the function above is diﬀerent from zero.
In addition, note that the sign of this derivative will determine which sector must have its risk exposure decreased
244.1 Impossibility for Pareto-improvement with perfect information Suppose that for-
eign investors have perfect information about the individual hedging position of all sector T’s
debtors. In this case, the contractual interest rate they require from each debtor will depend
only on her individual hedging position, which can now be directly monitored. In this case, as
the default probability of each debtor depends on her own risk exposure, debtors with diﬀerent
hedging positions will pay diﬀerent rates. Therefore, when each debtor chooses the size and the
sign of her hedging position, she has incentive to take into account the eﬀect of this decision
on the cost of her foreign debt. Given the limited structure of the model, this means that no
beneﬁt or cost of this decision is ignored by market participants. As a consequence, the risk
exposure is eﬃciently reallocated by private markets, so that ERRS policies will never bring a
Pareto improving for the home country. This point is well illustrated when we derive for this
case the marginal condition of optimization with respect to qT

























=0 ( 4 0 )
This condition must be met in equilibrium with full information. Note that the second term on
the left-hand side of the equation (40) is the marginal welfare change due to the eﬀect of the
risk reallocation on the sector T’s contractual interest rate. As it was explained in subsection
3.5, this term does not exist in condition (24) because sector T’s debtors take gT
0 as given when
information about their individual portfoliosi sa s y m m e t r i c . B a s e do nt h ec o n d i t i o n( 4 0 ) ,w e
can see why ERRS policies are not Pareto-improving interventions under perfect information
about individual hedging positions. For this, suppose on the contrary that a small change in
h0 brings a welfare gain for both sectors when the economy is in equilibrium with h0 =0 . I n
this case, the equilibrium condition (40) could not have been met. The reason is that private
markets are expected to provide incentives for trading, without a need for public intervention,
by intervention. As a particular case, suppose that W
¡
V T,VNT¢
= λV T +( 1− λ)V NT, where λ ∈ (0,1) is the
weight of the sector T’s welfare in government preferences. So, by using (35)-(36), the derivative of W (h0;Φ)















Suppose that there is λ = λ
∗ such that the derivative above is null. Thus, since K>0a n dK and L do not
depend on λ, governement should set h0 > 0(h0 < 0) when λ > λ
∗ (λ < λ
∗). As we can see in the second equality,
if λ > λ
∗, government provides hedge to the sector T, even if V NT falls with a higher h0.T h i se x a m p l es h o w st h a t
government preferences can be such that intervention takes place even if it does not bring a Pareto-improvement-
i.e., even when it has opposite eﬀects on the sectors’ welfare.
25if market participants are able to take full advantage of the beneﬁts and costs of an additional
risk reallocation.
4.2 Equilibrium with ¯ gT
0 = r0. This is the case described in (31), in which foreign investors
are not so pessimistic about µF to require a positive spread. In this case, a marginal change in
h0 has no eﬀect on ¯ gT
0
53:o n l y¯ dT
0 is aﬀected by the shift induced by ERRS policies on the foreign
credit’s supply and demand curves. Therefore, it follows from (38) that L(Φ) = 0 and hence
∆V T and ∆V NT, given by (34)-(36) respectively, have opposite signs. This means that there
is no scope for Pareto-improvement when ¯ gT
0 = r0 because gT
0 is already at its lowest possible
level. A higher (lower) h0 will cause a net welfare loss for the nontradable (tradable) sector
as it had its risk exposure increased without having been compensated by a fall in gT
0 . This
result allows us to conclude that, given the limited structure of the model, a positive spread in
equilibrium, which can be shrunk by ERRS policies, is a necessary condition for these policies
to be Pareto-improving interventions.
4.3 Equilibrium with ¯ gT
0 >r 0. This is the case described in (30), in which foreign investors
are so pessimistic about µF that they require a spread. In this case, we show below that there
is a range for µF such that a marginal change in h0 brings a Pareto-improvement for the home






0 (0)(µH − η)η
(µF − γ)
2 , (41)
where γ ≡ λ(0)(µH − η) − η. Next, substituting (30), (39) and (41) into (38) and noting that
λ
0 ( 0 )d o e sn o td e p e n d so nµF,w eh a v et h a t 54
lim
µF−→γ+ |L(Φ)| = lim
µF−→γ+
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
θλ
0 (0)(µH − η)
µF − γ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ = ∞+ . (42)
Since K (Φ)i n( 3 7 )i sﬁnite and does not depend on µF, it follows from (35)-(36) and (42) that
there are low enough levels of µF for both ∆V T and ∆V NT in (34) to have the same sign. In
these cases, we can also infer from (34)-(36) and (38)-(39) that ∆V T and ∆V NT are positive
if the change in h0 has the same sign of L(Φ) and then the opposite sign of the derivative in
(41) - i.e., if the sign of the change in h0 is such that it causes a reduction in ¯ gT
0 . Therefore,
53We just consider changes in h0 so small that the inequality λ(µH − η)+η ≤ µF still holds after them.
54Just the limit to right in (42) below is considered bacause, as seen in (30)-(31), a general equilibrium solution
exists only for µF > γ.
26we prove that ERRS policies may be Pareto-improving interventions. Note, however, that this
occurs only under the circumstances that foreign investors are enough overpessimistic, i.e., µF
must be suﬃciently lower than µH. In order to understand this result, note ﬁr s ti n( 3 0 )t h a t¯ gT
0
increases with a lower µF: as foreign investors are more pessimistic about sector T’s performance
and ability to repay, the supply curve in (20) shifts left, pushing ¯ gT
0 up. Moreover, as we saw in
subsection 3.4, this curve becomes more inelastic as gT
0 increases. Consequently, as µF decreases,
a change in h0, shifting the supply curve, has a stronger impact on gT
0 .
As seen above, Pareto-improvement does not always require a positive change in h0.A s
explained in subsection 3.5, this occurs because a change in h0 has an ambiguous eﬀect on ¯ gT
0 ,
which depends on the relative strength of its impact on the foreign credit’s supply and demand
curves (as functions of gT
0 ). Therefore, although the optimality of ERRS policies does require a
fall in the spread faced by the tradable sector, it is not necessarily this sector that must have
its risk exposure reduced in order to push ¯ gT
0 down. This is the case only when the derivative
in (41) is negative. Otherwise, it is the risk exposure of the nontradable sector that must be
reduced through a lower h0.
Once there is a domestic market for hedging in the home country, a very important question is
still to be answered: given that home country’s residents can trade privately their risk exposures,
why do they fail to internalize the welfare eﬀect of a lower debt cost into their allocative deci-
sions? In other words, why isn’t the eﬀect in (38) incorporated into the marginal conditions of
optimization (23)-(24)? As explained in subsection 2.4, the model assumes that foreign investors
can observe only the aggregate foreign debt and the aggregate hedging position of each home
country’s sector. They can not monitor the individual risk exposure and the individual foreign
liabilities of each home country’s debtor separately. Therefore, if an individual debtor buys more
hedge in the domestic market, she can not prevent her sector as a whole from free riding on
her by sharing the shrinking eﬀect on the spread of this change in her portfolio. Moreover, as
each sector is composed by a large number of identical individuals, this implies that the impact
of a rise in her hedging position on the spread she pays and hence on her welfare is negligible.
Consequently, when she chooses the size of this position, she has no incentive to take into ac-
count the eﬀect of this decision on the level of gT
0 . The model then turns out to be a particular
case of congestion game, so that the amount of risk exposure privately reallocated across sectors
is below the socially optimal level. It is necessary to be clear that imperfect information is a
necessary assumption for ERRS policies to be eﬃcient. Without it, as explained in subsection
4.1, intervention is pointless because home country’s residents will have incentive to incorporate
27all beneﬁts and costs of the hedging position acquired in the domestic hedge market into their
allocative decisions, so that the risk exposure will be eﬃciently reallocated across sectors by
competitive markets.
It is important to stress that a change in h0 brings a Pareto-improvement only for a certain
range of µF.F o r n o t s u ﬃciently low levels of µF,t h ef a l li ngT
0 is not large enough to bring
a welfare gain that fully compensates the welfare loss of the sector having its risk exposure
increased. In this case, ERRS policies do not bring a Pareto-improvement, even if the sector T
pays a spread that is aﬀected by ERRS policies and in addition foreign investors have imperfect
information about the individual portfolio of home debtors. We can then conclude that spread
and imperfect information are necessary, but not suﬃcient, conditions for Pareto-improvement.
As seen above, it is still necessary that ERRS policies cause a large enough fall in the spread.
But which determines the extent of this eﬀe c t ?I nt h i sm o d e l ,s p r e a di sp a i do n l yb e c a u s ef o r e i g n
investors are overpessimistic and in addition the more pessimist they are, the larger the impact of
those policies on the spread. As a result, intervention must not be necessarily eﬃcient whenever
there is heterogeneous beliefs about repayment. In addition, foreign investors must be suﬃciently
more pessimistic that home debtors about the ability of the latter to repay. In other words, it is
not suﬃcient to have µF <µ H. It is also necessary that µF be suﬃciently lower than µH.T h e
conclusion is that, although there are circumstances under which ERRS policies can be eﬃcient,
there are much more cases in which this does not occur.
It is important to have in mind that the results above do not allow us to conclude that
heterogeneous beliefs are, under any circunstances, a necessary condition for ERRS policies to
bring a Pareto-improvement. This assumption was introduced into this model because it is the
way through which the spread is caused by overpessimism and it is just this fact that allows us
to insert the discussion around the optimality of ERRS policies into the literature on imperfect
information-related market failures in the world capital markets. As seen in subsection 4.1,
although homogeneous beliefs (µF = µH) in this model implies that there is no scope for Pareto-
improvement, this occurs only because we assume in subsection 3.5, for the sake of simplicity,
that the penalties for default are so large that debtors have no incentive to default, so that gT
0
is already in its lowest possible level r0. Suppose now that beliefs are homogeneous, but both
foreign and home countries are equally so pessimistic about repayment that a spread is paid
in equilibrium. Although the optimality of ERRS policies in this case is not addressed by this
paper, we think that they could still bring a Pareto-improvement under some ciscunstances. This
is because the market still fails to reach an eﬃcient exchange rate risk sharing if we maintain
28the assumption, described in subsection 2.4, that foreign creditors are imperfectly informed on
the individual hedging position of each home country’s debtor. Looking more deeply into this
question could be a topic for further research.
Finally, ERRS policies could have costs that must be taken into account by governments
gauging their optimality. Besides the bureaucratic costs and other ones associated to errors in
policy evaluation and implementation, distortionary taxation can be borrowed from literature
on public debt management as another important drawback of this kind of intervention55.O t h e r
diﬀerent type of cost has to do with the process through with expectations are formed, since
intervention could keep foreign investors from learning over time with their own expectational
error56.
55Bohn (1990) suggests the reasons why this could take place. Note ﬁrst that a large part of the government
receipts comes from taxes on the labor income, which encourage taxpayers to spend wasteful resources trying to
evade or shelter income. This excessive burden of the taxation leads to a social welfare loss that can be measured
in this model in terms of wasted endowment. Note next that this excessive burden could increase if ERRS policies
make public expenditures vulnerable to shocks to yT
1 . To see how this could occur, suppose that the excessive
burden is an increasing and convex function of the tax rate on the labor income. In this case, if a complet set of
Arrow-Debreu contingent securities existed, the optimal tax rule would be hold the tax rate constant. However, in
a context of incomplete markets, government would be forced to change the tax rate to keep its budget balanced
whenever they face a shock to the public expenditures. Under these circunstances, the excessive burden and then
the social welfare loss increase with the volatility of the public expenditures, which in this model is determined
by the shocks to yT
1 . If this volatility is enough high, ERRS policies could become unattractive.
56We know that overpessimism in this model occurs when foreign creditors underestimate the expected future
sector T’s performance, so that µF is pushed down from µH. Moreover, we have implicitly assumed that home
country’s residents form their expectations correctly. Therefore, as default probability in foreign creditors’ belief
rises with a lower µF, overpessimism implies that foreign creditors expect default at a frequency higher that
the one supported by home country’s fundamentals. In this case, suppose in addition that foreign creditors
update their expectations as new information on default arrives and that reliable and timely information on the
realization of yT
1 is hard to be collected or provided. Given this context, we compare the cases in that ERRS
policies are implemented and are not. If there is no intervention when overpessimism arises, foreign creditors will
learn over time that default does not occur so often as they expected and then they will revise their expectations
on home country’s fundamentals upwards. Therefore, even with short-term welfare losses, the alternative of no
intervention has the long-term beneﬁt of making foreign creditors expectations become less sensitive to false
rumors hitting the market. On the other hand, suppose that intervention does occur whenever foreign creditors
are overpessimistic and that in addition it is eﬀective to squeeze the spread. Now, the learning process above is
impaired as foreign creditors will wrongly conclude that the frequency of default is low because of the government
intervention, when in true this occurs because the home country’s fundamentals are not so bad as they expected.
In this case, ERRS policies would keep the market from learning on its own expectational errors. Therefore, if
29Costs associated to ERRS policies leads us to ﬁgure out alternative policies to cope with the
imperfect information-related market failures in the model. As an example, a public eﬀort could
be done to provide timely and credible information . This strategy could, at least to some extent,
attenuate the lack of information. First, foreign investors would be better informed about home
country’s fundamentals. In this case, it is less likely that herd behavior will lead foreign investors
to run away from home country’s securities when this decision is not supported by an actual
deterioration in fundamentals. Second, foreign investors could have access to more disaggregated
information and hence be also able to monitor the individual portfolio of each debtor. In this
case, market would be eﬃcient to reallocate exchange rate risk, so that intervention would be
unnecessary.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We know that ERRS policies are not Pareto-improving interventions under full information and
perfect competitive markets. Therefore, the model derives under which circumstances these
policies may bring a Pareto improvement for a indebted small open economy. There is a need
for market imperfections and several other pre-conditions. In the model, the tradable sector
pays a spread on its foreign debt because foreign investors are relatively overpessimistic about
repayment and in addition they observe only the aggregate exchange rate risk exposure of the
tradable and the nontradable sectors. As foreign investors are not able to monitor the risk
exposure of a particular debtor, the shrinking eﬀect on the spread of a higher hedging position
against exchange rate shocks can be regarded as a rival and non-excludable ”good”, so that
our model is a particular case of congestion game. Consequently, competitive markets lead to
a suboptimal reallocation of the exchange rate risk exposure across the home country. Based
on Calvo and Mendoza (2000a,b), the imperfect information-related market imperfections on
which this model relies could be supported by ﬁnancial globalization in a context of institutional
constraints, which keep foreign investors from taking full advantage of costly information, while
diversiﬁcation continues to be an optimal strategy.
However, Pareto-improvement also requires that the welfare loss of the sector having its
ERRS policies are always triggered to avoid short-term distortions caused by overpessimism, this alternative can
no more be abandoned, unless the government accepts short-term welfare losses while the learning process cited
above is not fully achieved. As a result, since intervention has social costs associated to its implementation, it
could be better for the government, in a long-term perspective, to leave the market works alone.
30wealth volatility increased is lower than the welfare gain provided by a smaller spread. This
in turn only takes place when foreign investors are very pessimistic about the home economy’s
ability to repay so that the credit supply curve is very little responsive to the contractual interest
rate. Otherwise, ERRS policies do not bring a Pareto-improvement, even if spread and market
failures do exist.
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with a suﬃciently large ²T and a parameter










such that the sector T has never incentive to default, namely, πT
H =0in equilibrium.
Proof. For a given (di
0,q i
0,f 0)i=T,NT,w ed e ﬁne x as the solution of the equation (µH − η)x = k,
where k,t h ee ﬀective cut-oﬀ level of yT
1 for default, is given by (16). Substituting (16) into the equation



























Moreover, we know from (1) that, in home country’s belief, the lowest possible level for yT
1 is µH − η.
According to (17), this implies that πT
H =0if and only if x ≤ 1.
As we saw in subsection 3.5, the home country reaches an equilibrium at a vector (di
0,qi
0,f 0)i=T,NT
if and only if this vector meets the marginal conditions (23)-(24), where consumption and relative prices
are given, respectively, by (4)-(5) and (11)-(14). Consequently, it follows from the results above that
there is an equilibrium solution for the home country with πT
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[x(µH − η)(1− qT
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33where (A2)-(A4) are derived by substituting (A1) into the equation (23) for i = T and into the equation
(24) for i = T,NT. In particular, when h0 =0 , it follows from (A2)-(A4) that there is an equilibrium
solution with πT












,w i t h
λ(0) ≤ 1 and q
H,T
0 (0) = 0, such that λ(0) and fH






1 − x(µH − η)[1− exp(−²T)]
¸
=0 ; ( A 5 )
1





1 − x(µH − η)[1− exp(−²T)]
¸
=0 . (A6)
According to section 4, we just examine the welfare properties of ERRS policies that consist in very
small changes of h0 around 0. Therefore, in order to prove the proposition, it is suﬃcient to show that,
for a large enough ²T, the equation (A6) is solved for x = λ(0) ≤ 157.F o rt h i s ,w ed e ﬁne the function
A(x,ΦH) as the left-hand side of (A6), so that
A(x;ΦH)=
1










(µH − η) − x(µH − η)[1− exp(−²T)]
. (A7)
It is trivial to see in (A7) that
lim
x−→0+ A(x;ΦH)=∞+ ;( A 8 )
lim
x−→ξ− A(x;ΦH)=∞− , (A9)









It follows from (A8)-(A10) that the graph of the function A(x;ΦH) intercepts the horizontal axis at an
unique point x = λ(0) between 0 and ξ, which hence solves the equation (A6)- i.e., there is an unique
λ(0) such that A(λ(0);ΦH)=0 . We still have to show that, given (β,θ,µ H,η),t h e r ei sa²T so large




57Note that (A6) does not depend on f0. After we get λ(0) from (A6), we substitute it into (A5) in
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